always said from the agreement we wanted to find the cuts and we believe we can and we have proven we can and we can get it off of the 4 of the house. this goes back to my earlier point. ..

[applause] >> well, thank you all so much. it is a great pleasure and privilege for me to be back at the constitution center with so many friends, friends from the penn community whom i see here and other threfl yangs, and

especially to be here for the launch of this book. as dennis suggested, i cover politics which means i cover a lot of conflict but not very much compromise. [laughter] so coming from washington to philadelphia where there were so many historic compromises only a block or two from here is a perfect setting for a truly terrific book. and for those of you who are just getting it tonight, i can tell you, this is a great read. so that's the advance plug because i won't normally say that. it's just that it really is that good. i've learned a lot. it also was a way for me to relearn things about conflicts and compromises that i've covered live anything washington. i wanted to ask dr. gutman and dr. thompson to talk about what -- how do you govern without compromise? it was suggested in your book

you talk about alan simpson, who i know very well and bowles-simpson, you can't legislate without compromises, you might as well go home. to that mind how do we get past the gridlock, and what inspired you both to collaborate on this book? i assume there were a lot of compromises along the way. [laughter] >> no compromises in writing. but compromise has seen better days in this country and not surprisingly, andrea, government has seen better days in this country, and it's not surprising that the same time when compromise is at its ebb, the popularity of our congress is also now in single digits or barely 10%. and, you know, that accounts for the families and relatives of congressmen, right? so there you go. [laughter] >> and we're not sure about them. >> exactly, exactly.

[laughter] so seriously, our diagnosis, there are many causes, but our diagnosis is that we're living in the era on a permanent campaign where every day is election day, and compromise doesn't fit election nearing well. you stand up for your principles, you don't do anything about them but you stand for them verbally, and you defeat your opponents in a campaign. and when a campaign lasts, essentially forever, there's no room for governing. so that's the problem, and then you say, well, how does democracy do without governing? not very well, is the answer. so we're looking to get people to recognize that it's really important to free your mind from

the notion that all you do is campaign all the time and stand on principle. >> and one of the things that's so wonderful about the book is you do suggest reforms and new ideas for dealing with some of the more pernicious problems that causes -- [inaudible] we can talk about that in a moment because they include the media, so this event is really revelatory for me, but it's the media, it's the money, i mean, it's all of the above. but as you write, campaigns require mutual mistrust. professor thompson, that requires an uncompromising mindset. so how do you break out of those boundaries? >> well, that's, andrea, right on the mark. you've obviously read the book more carefully -- [laughter] i told her it's frightening, she has it marked -- >> they taught me at penn to do

my homework. [laughter] >> my students haven't read it that carefully. [laughter] one of the important points, actually, is we're not against being uncompromising. we think in campaigns, as amy suggested, you really do have to defeat your to points. it's a zero sum game, actually, somebody's going to win, and somebody's going to lose. and we don't imagine that we're going to -- we don't want to turn campaigns into a compromising kind of climate. the trick is how do you switch after that and govern? and that's the problem now, people aren't making that switch. they used to be able to do that. they used to be able to do that more even though there was always campaigning because the campaign wasn't permanent. is so some of the suggestions that we have are that to give space for governing x maybe we

should -- and maybe we should say the institutions -- >> why don't we start, though, by saying what the uncompromising mind is. >> let me set up the context. >> okay. >> most recently the midterms, the 2010 midterms -- >> right. >> -- which elected 87 largely tea party-supported republicans and created enormous conflict within the caucus putting the speaker, john boehner, on the spot. and thisas perhaps best illustrated as recounted in your book by my friend, leslie stahl's' interview. >> okay. he's going to be john boehner, and i'm going to be leslie stahl. [laughter] and we're not acting this, we're reading -- >> i didn't volunteer for this. [laughter] >> you go first. >> well -- >> aren't you lucky? >> yes, okay. i'll try. >> this is serious. [laughter] >> i'll try. it starts, actually, in the

interview a clip from obama saying when mr. boehner becomes speaker, he's going to have to govern. he can't stand on the sidelines and throw bombs. and so boehner: we have to govern, that's what we were elected to do. >> but governing means compromising. >> it means working together. >> it also means compromising. >> it means finding common ground. >> okay. doesn't that mean compromising? >> i am clear, i'm not going to compromise on my principles, nor am i going to compromise the will of the american people. [laughter] >> so you're saying i want common ground, but i'm not going to compromise? i don't understand that, i really don't. >> when you say the word "compromise," a lot of americans look up and go, uh-oh, they're going to sell me out. so finding common ground, i

think, makes more sense. >> so, look, you tried to make all the bush tax cuts permanent, so you did compromise. >> we found common ground. >> why won't you say -- you're afraid of the word? >> can i reject the word. [laughter] >> that conversation on "60 minutes" was people in the house caucus, some of the freshmen, thought he had been too con conciliatory and were afraid that john boehner was signaling too much flexibility, and he actually was punished within the caucus which was beginning to lahr rebel and some of already to rebel. >> you might not notice this, but i'm sympathetic to john boehner partly for the reason you suggested. he was sort of trying. the other reason is, this is not well known, and i usually

don't -- i was born and raised in hamilton, ohio. some of you may know that's the principal city. and if i had stayed there and hadn't freed myself, he would be my representative now. >> so here's the -- >> that's why my imitation was so good. [laughter] >> here's the reason not to be -- so let me just give you the reason not to be too sympathetic. [laughter] um, i am leslie stahl, right? i'm not supposed to be sympathetic. here's the reason not to be too sympathetic. even though we know boehner faced lots of tea party representatives who were elected on a very uncompromising platform, poll after poll as the crisis neared showed that even a majority of tea party supporters wanted their own representatives to compromise. and yet the people they voted for refused to do it.

so there was and there is, i believe, real room for political leadership married with courage if you're willing to actually go out a little bit on a him which john boehner was not willing to do. >> now, in the book you look at a number of case studies, examples, and some from not-such-distant histories that i even covered. the 1986 tax reform act. i was covering the reagan white house, tip o'neill was the speaker, and there was a critical point where o'neill could have let it go down. it was the president's signature initiative. and in the senate bill bradley was working on it. it was bipartisan in both houses and, in fact, bob packwood -- the republican finance chair in the senate -- became so pragmatic politically knowing that it could help him with his

re-election, with his constituency if he signed on to this, but at one point tip o'neill, as you write, could have gone the other way and just let it go down. but he trusted the fact that ronald reagan could deliver enough republican votes to make it a bipartisan bill. and there's, there are levels and levels of this because it does speak to the good ole days, 1986 the good ole days, it's hard to say. but there were personal relationships that after hours o'neill and reagan got together. and as we were discussing earlier, that tip knew the leadership and legislative staff people from the reagan white house, from daily trips to the hill. he knew that they could deliver the votes. >> right. >> yeah. this is why it's so great to have you as a moderator. you actually -- >> [inaudible] >> tell our story for us. and one of the key considerations that we emphasize in the book is personal

relationships and trust. and those develop only over time if people stay in washington. so this newt gingrich comes in, says everybody take your families home, only live here three days a week. so that's important. but also notice -- which i don't have to tell you -- these were partisans. i mean, tip o'neill and ronald reagan, and they weren't particularly close friends. they respected one another, they knew one another's political integrity. but, and they were not sort of moderates particularly. so this should be a lesson for those who say polarization and extremism makes compromise impossible. it doesn't. i mean, even today or in recent years we have got ted kennedy and orrin hatch coming together for important legislation. and these are not sort of

moderate people. they know how to compromise. that's a key lesson of that time, and we should go back. i'd like to read your or see your reporting from then. we should have paid more attention to it. >> ephemeral, as is so much we do. [laughter] but the health care act is another that you look at. why were the seeds -- first of all, the permanent campaign and the august recess had a lot to do with the distrust that really poisoned the atmosphere. the seeds of its eventual lack of support, political support, really were wilt -- built into the way it was legislated, was it not? >> yeah. so i think it's really interesting to compare the tax reform act of '86 with the health care act. that's the way we do it in the book. it's really interesting, read the book. no, here's what i find most

interesting, that as hard as it was to do the bipartisan tax reform act which was the major tax reform of the century, it was just as hard to get health care through in one party. and there was a lot of compromise within the party. and there was almost no possibility of bipartisanship. and it was a game of chicken that both parties were playing. and i know people would depending on whether you ask republicans or democrats, you'll blame the other party on this. it's absolutely true that the republican party has veered to the right, the democrats to the left, the republicans more to the right. proportionately. but it's also true that the democrats didn't seriously entertain tort reform, for example. and they both felt that the to their political advantage not to come together. and i would go back to what you

said earlier about the tax reform. they didn't have relationships. the principal members didn't, and it's not surprising that when the debt ceiling crisis, it was joe biden and mitch mcconnell who have known each other for two decades who sat down together. that wasn't true in health care reform. >> the debt crisis, there was no reason for that to become a crisis. this is normally routine legislation. so what is it about the atmosphere in washington that incented all sides to create a crisis where none needed to be? or one side? >> because you say, it should have been routine. more than 70 times it's been raised without many people getting upset. and two things. one, i mean, they got an agreement, but it was under the gun. i mean, it was a real crisis that everybody recognized, and

as amy mentioned, the personal relationship between mitch mcconnell and joe biden. but also, you know, this wasn't a success story in the end. it averted the crisis, but it as they say in washington, kicked the can down the road. the supercommittee didn't use its superpowers. it failed. and interestingly, you know, when do you think we'll face this again? not, nobody thinks we're going to face this and settle this sequestering before the election which is one of our points. you can't govern if you're thinking about the election all the time. >> let's go back for a moment because of where we are. to first principles and whatever lesson we can learn from history. you talk about the grand compromises reached at the constitutional convention in 787 -- 1787, the slavery compromise, the unequal

representation compromise which weren't necessarily that grand. i was very intrigued, i wanted to ask you about that, but also you cite some of the rules that helped them achieve that compromise one of which was mutual respect, no walking around or talking. translate that to the current house floor on any given day or the senate floor, and you couldal almost say, you know, no blackberries, no talking. >> little things can make a big difference. >> little things can make a big difference. >> little things can make a big difference s and there were just some small rules of respect. and one of the teachers of the compromising mindset is mutual respect. and you don't have to agree with people to respect them. tip o'neill and ronald reagan were fierce opponents. but when it came to governing, they respected each other. and the constitutional convention, the founders were

very clever about small rules. now, it also helped that they did it in secret. there weren't cameras there, you know, they -- but there was a lot at stake, and the compromises that they made, if you think -- if you don't -- pick the compromise that you would least like to happen because of your politics. the compromise that happened to make the constitution possible just makes anything that we would object to look easy. and it was because of these rules. so let me give you an example. everybody, i think, one of the favorite institutions that people would like to change in order to make compromise more likely is the filibuster. so, one, it's not going to happen without a compromise. you're not going to abolish the filibuster without a compromise. so one compromise would be,

okay, you keep the filibuster, but the senators have to be on the floor and actually filibuster. and, therefore, this could be where the media would be on the right side. the media could actually show the american public who it is who's holding up these bills. that would at least help a small change -- a small change would help make a big difference in the pit of compromise. >> and just to elaborate from that, the secret holes that senates can hold on nominations which really paralyzes departments. and this happens in both parties. but at the height of the financial crisis, the treasury department couldn't get any confirm. now could go testify, nobody could run key divisions within that agency, and it happened most memorably with judicial appointments. >> yeah. see universities are so efficient compared to -- [laughter] let me tell you. >> well, there we may disagree.

>> may not agree with us, but they really are. >> let me ask you about what you discuss on confidentiality because are there times when confidentiality creates more mistrust? >> uh-huh. >> the gang of six comes to mind and other panels that are trying to do, you know, really significant things. they can only do can it outside of -- [inaudible] not only people like me, but also their colleagues. but it creates so much mistrust that eventually it becomes really difficult? >> well, yeah, i mean, i think that's a problem, andrea. there is a balance that the constitutional convention confidentiality was justified because they didn't make a final decision. it went to ratification. >> yeah. >> and while the deliberations weren't all that, weren't covered by you -- which i wouldn't trust anybody else, but i trust you --

[laughter] they, people did have a sense of what the arguments were. contemporary cases are a little harder because you do want to have opportunities for maybe not to keep it secret for their colleagues which i think was part of the problem with the example you mentioned, but you need some space where you can confidentially exchange views without pretending you're in a campaign. but we're in a democracy, and so that should eventually come out. you know, what was said to some extent should be public. so there is a kind of balance, and i think the media -- >> that's a great segway. >> -- is our only hope for this. >> that is the elephant in the room, because i do think that we and the media now are in so many different forms, and it has

morphed into instantaneous twitter feeds which do influence, i mean, the news cycle is constant. so there is no deliberative process involved. and how do you think that instantaneous bombardment, to say nothing of outside of national newspapers which are challenged and national network newscasts which are challenged and public broadcasting which is constantly under attack, what about the influence of cable, talk radio, television, advocate is i, adversarial talk and conversation? >> yeah, yeah. so the 24-hour news cycle certainly puts a premium on extremist rhetoric. because you can repeat it over and over again, and it's titillating in its own way. and it also puts a premium on

what's easy to do which is horse race coverage. so whatever you say it's not the content, whatever a politician says, it's not the content of what they say, it's, okay, they said it in order to get some political advantage, and that just goes over and over again, and it's pretty simple to do in itself. but we advocate for -- so that's what we'd call horse race coverage, narrow political coverage. there is broader political coverage which is still strategic and exciting which something like "meet the press" and "60 minutes" do, and they sell -- they get really good audiences. it's harder to do, but it's so much better, and it would put journalists in so much better a light. so that's -- i'm not -- it's not hopeless. the good thing is that people are using the internet media with in addition to network news

and, you know, other things. so i think it certainly feeds into the campaign mentality to have a 24/7 news cycle. but we still need the media to coffer the issue -- to cover the issues for us. >> and issues that often get so distorted by the process. immigration comes to mind because one of the things that you look at is the bush effort, well, first senator simpson. there was a compromise, a very painful compromise on immigration. then under pressure there was an attempt -- then under president bush there was an attempt to update immigration reform in really meaningful ways x. in the midst of a presidential campaign, it went completely off track. senator mccain was being punished for his partnership with senator kennedy. how was that an example of -- >> a good example.

>> -- failure. >> i'll say something about that, but i can't let it go. one of the recommendations about media that we suggest is there should be more rotation of -- so the people who coffer campaigns aren't just covering the campaigns, that they've also done substantive work. and so foreign correspondents might, in fact, cover campaigns. something about you. [laughter] now, on immigration one of the features of a compromise that makes it difficult is that usually the classic compromise includes conflicting principles. so in immigration simpson-my solely and then the later one that failed, amnesty was included with opportunities to become citizens. so two really competing

principles that the people on each side really rejected. it wasn't that they found common ground, it's that they agreed to a principle and a piece of legislation that had their principle expressed but a principle that they hated also in the legislation. so it wasn't common ground. the messy. and unattractive. and it succeeded in the early '80s with simpson and miss solely because it wasn't quite the permanent campaign. they trusted one another, and these were two partisans who knew how to -- who had credibility because they were partisans and could without losing their base compromise. it failed. each though you -- even though you had arlen specter and other very respectable people on both sides, it failed because the permanent campaign had completely taken over. >> yeah. i don't think immigration reform, major immigration reform, is possible in this country in, um, the context of

the permanent campaign. because it is -- even though it makes so much sense, the passwords here are amnesty and taking away jobs from american workers. and it gets notrack. no traction with a campaigning mentality. and there's when you need some time for governing, because this country is great because we're a nation of immigrants. and it's only going to stay great if we continue to be a nation of immigrants. and so the biggest, i would say one of the biggest travesties of the permanent campaign is the failure of of immigration reform in this country. >> what is the role of money in all of this? i know -- [laughter] i know from covering the senate in the past some of the really splendid senators in recent history in both parties who left the senate because they hated

the money chase. and this is back in '92 and '94 and '96. and it's been a long time. that created a lot of openings where house members moved up to the senate and brought the different culture of the house, much more adversarial culture, less collegiality, less spirit of compromise, if you will. but how has this money chase hurt compromise? >> so the more -- yeah. the more, the more time spent campaigning, the more money counts in politics. and it's, oh, i remember hubert humphrey said it's demeaning, degrading and disgusting, right? that was a long time ago, and it hasn't got cannen better. it's gotten worse, and it's gotten worse because if it's 24/7 and every day of the week is election day, you can use money to buy media time. and the supreme court hasn't helped on this a hot. on this a lot.

the root of the problem is actually not money. the root of the problem is the permanent campaign which money facilitates, it greases the wheels of it. and now it's not just what president obama or candidate romney can raise, it's what the super pacs raise which is hundreds of millions of dollars now. >> one of your suggestions is a time limit, sort of a money ban for a period. >> yes. >> do you think that could pass constitutional muster within a legislative -- >> oh, i think it could pass constitutional muster. >> yeah. >> but whether it could pass disturb. >> yeah, that's -- [laughter] >> is part of the problem. all of these as you kindly pointed out that we have lots of good institutional reform suggestions, but most of them depend on compromising mindsets to pass the institutional reform. in fact, it may even be harder to do that than it is to pass

legislation. so there's a catch 23 -- catch 22 here. you've got to have a compromising mindset to pass the constitutional reforms that will enable you to be compromising. we think there's a way out of that. we do suggest banning, as other people have, banning fund raising in congressmen outside of your district, banning leadership pacs which can become quite -- you know, there's some grassroots fund razeeing reform -- fund raising reform like the fair elections act now which we talk about. all of these are sort of trying to skirt around the position that the supreme court has put us in which we don't go into this in the book, i'll just express my opinion. i think the court has overinterpretted the first amendment in banning too many things like the arizona plan for

financing campaigns. but we think reasonable people who try to compromise are trying to work around, and there are things that can be done within these constitutional constraints. and i think would help. but as amy said, we tried it, and we think we should keep focused on it's not only money. i mean, if you think money is the root of it, then it's going to be here for a long time, and that'll be another excuse not to compromise. >> i hear examples that you can find -- are there examples that you can find where compromise is not a good thing? >> yeah. so the argument that i think you all could agree with is compromise isn't always a good thing. and, indeed, in campaigns you don't want whoever your candidate is, suppose you're, you know, you're a fan of

president obama. you don't want him to go with on the campaign trail saying i'm willing to compromise with my republican colleagues in the following ways. that would be -- i would go so far as that would actually be not the ethical thing to do because you're selling out your own side before the other side has offered you anything. so compromise isn't the stance you should take when you're campaigning which means it's so much more important to make space for governing. and i would be in favor of congress agreeing that they would spend, you know, at least four days a week in washington governing and not out on the campaign trail raising money. and there are some compromises that are really bad compromises. and the limiting case is when one side basically capitulates to the other. that's not even a compromise. so not all compromises are good,

but we're living in an era where compromise is a dirty word, so it needs resuscitation. i don't think it's dead, but it's on life support, and we need to realize nobody likes to compromise. but the alternative the to compromise in democracy is the death of democracy. >> i reject the word. [laughter] >> just parenthetically, dr. thompson, you mentioned earlier newt gingrich in terms of -- >> i'm sorry. [laughter] >> who us i pended his campaign officially today. you mentioned gingrich -- >> we probably could get applause for that. >> the context of the not going home. when he became speaker and he said to his new members that he wanted them, rather, to go home and not make their homes in washington so that they didn't know each other, their spouses didn't know each other, there wasn't any kind of community spirit. and it became known as the tuesday to husband club.

so they were in town tuesday, wednesday and thursday, and then they went home to raise money. they always said they were going to constituent meetings, but they were basically meeting with fund raisers, and it was really newt when he became speaker to made that the regimen. >> yes. you were there. and that was a turning point on, for a very important and unfortunate development. we tend to think that it would be good if our representatives went back home and talked to their constituents, and it would. but as you've suggested, they talk to their fundraisers, their bundlers. they talk to the same people who are encouraging them to be uncompromising, the same people who actually want them to compromise later, they sort of forget, gee, i did tell you not to compromise, but now there's this terrible crisis. so one of the things i think that would help -- here's something -- when we did an op-ed piece in the times, we got

some e-mail saying, great, this is a wonderful argument for term limits because there are a lot of -- you might -- it's not unreasonable to think if you have term limits, then at least some people in congress will not be thinking about being reelected. that has other problems, but it sounds good. the problem is that if you have term limits, you don't build relationships over time, and there are actually some studies, state legislatures in michigan, for example, that show when they put term limits into effect, people don't trust one another, the legislators don't trust one another, there's less compromising going on. so the term limits, there may be a case for term limits, but it's certainly not a case that anybody who wants to have reasonable come propoise would -- compromise would

endorse. >> in the book you write about 2011 being the year of the pledge. >> oh. >> dr. gutmann, talk about the year of the pledge and how that ties people's hands. >> so a majority of members of the house and 41 senators have taken the grover norquist pledge which is they will not support any tax increases. and somebody like alan simpson rightly says that that's crazy to do in politics, to promise that you're never going to do x and stand on principle. why is it? because you don't, you can't govern, you can't sit down at the table and make any deals. and i think you all remember when the republican primary candidates -- when there was still many of them -- were asked, okay, would you agree to $1 in increased taxes for

revenues for $10 of cuts in government spending, and not one of them would agree to that. they had all taken the norquist pledge. and that just really blocks not just compromise, it blocks governing. so why do they do it? well, the dream of every partisan -- and democrats, imagine -- if you're republican, imagine democrats taking the same pledge, we will not agree to $1 in benefits cuts. not $3 -- not $1 to medicare, medicaid, any entitlement cuts. and why do they do it? because it really, it drives a sake in the ground, it's very inspiring to the true believers, and it really caters to the base. so it's a great campaigning tactic, but i would go as far as

to saying it's lunacy. it's, it is, if that continues, it would be the death of democracy. i don't think it could continue because even a majority of tea party supporters when asked directly, okay, your representative, the representative you agree with the most, would you be willing to your representative agreeing to tax increases in order to avert the debt ceiling crisis? and a majority of them said, yes. so it's not the american public that's driving this although sometimes they fuel it in lengths. it's really the -- in elections. it's really the people taking these promises, and it sounds good. i will never compromise my principles. >> and it's for fear that a group such as grover norquist's will run a primary opponent against them if they violate the pledge. and the pledges were also op social issues, um, abortion, on banning abortion in more extreme

circumstances and also banning same-of sex marriage. >> you know -- >> well, yeah. the marriage vow which is a little sneaky, actually, that was a pledge, as you know, taken in the primary. i'll be faithful to my wife or husband. better do that, better -- i'll be against sharia law taking over. well, that's a great threat. we've certainly got -- [laughter] but then they meet on same-sex marriage. so it wasn't this harmless little pledge. >> but, you know, absolute promises are very good for marriages. they're very bad for governing. [laughter] so, and my husband's here, so i had to say the first part of it. [laughter] >> well, i want to bring everyone in with their questions as well. we're going to pass questions up. of but one final thought was you have -- this is not your first book together. >> uh-huh. >> so it is a writing marriage of sorts. how to you compromise, and have

there been times when you had to work out disagreements in creating "the spirit of compromise"? better not say? [laughter] >> no. >> um -- go ahead. [laughter] when we wrote "democracy and disagreement," i like to say i'm democracy, and he's disagreement. [laughter] and then, of course, he disagreed which just proved my point. [laughter] >> we sort of anticipated the question, and we were -- i was supposed to say yes, and you were supposed to say no, and so we couldn't even agree on who was going to say yes and no. [laughter] couple -- one thing, look at the cover of the book. >> better still, buy it. but -- >> well, i'll give you a free, if our editor is here and he knows how much time, we maybe spent more time on the fonts on the word "compromise." see if you see how -- [laughter] this is a deep meaning.

we, the designers, it looks like there was six designers because there's six different kinds of fonts. >> the truth is, the hardest thing to agree on, we had no disagreement of the contempt, the cover. but we like the cover, don't we, deb mis? >> yes. [laughter] >> just say yes. >> just say yes. but there is a serious point -- [laughter] >> there is? >> one of the messages which we alluded to before is that compromises in politics are messy. they're not always common ground, win/win situations. they're conflicting, messy, incoherent often if you look at it as a political philosopher would, which we are sometimes. we would like to think that the book isn't messy and incoherent. [laughter] you'll judge that. but we also would like to think that you could write a book that's more or less coherent

that might actually have some effect on the messy and incoherent world of politics that we live in. so see if you agree. if you don't -- >> well, i certainly agree. we have some questions from the audience. one is, it seems that members of congress have gotten more extreme because of gerrymandering. how do we reform that without waiting another ten years? >> yeah. so, you know, it's interesting, um, that's a great question because it is commonly thought that congress has become more polarized and partisan because of gerrymandering. and there's actually not -- political scientists will tell you that there's not good evidence for that. however, we do argue and there is good evidence for the idea that it doesn't make sense for partisans in congress to decide

on redistricting. there ought to be, and denniss has written an article on this, there ought to be independent commissions that decide how to redistrict because whatever the fact of the matter, polarization has many causes. but it doesn't inspire confidence in our political system to have the party in power be the one that decides on redistricting. >> now, there's a question, rather than compromising, isn't it better for politicians to take strong positions and win big in the next election so they won't have to compromise? [laughter] >> with well, yes. nice work if you can get it. the problem, first of all, is that it's very unlikely that one party can gain complete control, that is the presidency, both houses of congress and veto-proof or filibuster-proof majority in the senate.

you can hope, some of us hope that it's the democrats, and some of it's hope that it's the republicans. but notice even if that happens as we saw in the health care bill, it's still going to be hard, very hard to compromise. and the trouble with legislation that comes out of a one-party-dominated government which is going to be rare anyhow is that it's not sustainable. because given the way american politics go, the next party will overturn it or won't implement it. so there really isn't escape from compromise. a lot of our friends, you know, sort of are saying, well, just -- it's a good question. it sounds like some of my friends in cambridge say what's all this talk about compromise? let's just get out and get the democrats to control the senate

and the house and reelect obama, and we'll forget about all in this nonsense with boehner and the republicans. good luck. [laughter] >> and the republicans want to do the exact same thing, and neither in our system -- in a parliamentary system, the government is the government in this power. in our electoral system for good and bad reasons, um, it was set up so it'd be very hard to have a party in power that didn't have to sit down and govern with the minority party. >> you've spoken about respect, and one of the questions is, could you address the issue of comity or cordiality? we spoke about it just in passing, about some of the rules that the constitutional convention had. how important is it in crediting

the space for -- creating the space for compromise? if it's important, how can it be fostered on capitol hill and between the hill -- >> i think mutual respect is the coin of the realm of governing. and i think without it, as andrea has suggest inside what she's seen in 1986, there would not have been a tax reform act. and if you don't like the tax reform act, pick any other piece of legislation between kennedy and hatch, for example. you know, americans for disabilities act, health care for children. kennedy and hatch had a respect for one another while they were wildly partisan. and really identified with the left and right wings of their party. so i think respect is incredibly important, and the question is, how do you cultivate it in the

era of a permanent campaign in and i think there are some simple ways of doing it. and i would start with having congress, um, spend more time with each other and less time out there raising money. >> one thing comes to mind is that the primaries themselves have become so poisonous. next tuesday in indiana there's going to be a republican primary for the nomination for senate. and one of the great weapons that the challenger is using against dick lugar -- veteran republican and former chairman, now ranking member of the foreign relations committee -- he cosponsored nunn-lugar which was, i think most people would say, landmark legislation to control fissile material at the

collapse of the soviet union and bring it under sane management. so what do you do where you have primaries where your record of compromise and achievement is being used against you because of the throw the bums out, anti-washington, you know, anti-washington insider mentality? >> well, in the short run, not too much. but i think that illustrates why it's so important that voters themselves and citizens begin to learn that if they want government rather than campaigning all the time, they've got to support people like dick lugar. >> yep. >> the other thing i'd say about primaries which we do say in the book is the primary system itself is not ideal. that is, i think we would favor open primaries, not necessarily like california had which was struck down by the supreme court, but something like the state of washington where the

candidates declare tear partisan affiliation -- declare their partisan affiliation, but you as a voter can choose whichever candidate that you prefer, and those, the two top candidates go on to the general election. so that -- open primaries tend to produce more moderate candidates. and then we would be choosing not between extremes, but between people who were more likely to be able to compromise. so the system itself, you know, maybe you want it more extreme. but the system is designed to make that almost a certainty now in most states. >> one questioner is asking: beyond domestic politics, can the spirit of compromise be applied to foreign affairs, and would a compromising america be disadvantaged in a seemingly uncompromising world? >> a question for you, andrea. [laughter] >> yeah. so we write about compromise in

democracy in part because the, you can compromise in democracy in a fairly safe space. internationally, um, when you're doing it between countries, often what's at stake is war or no war, mass slaughter or not. i -- there's a, there's a terrific book on this, i think, and we comment on it, and the author is very much in favor of compromise in international politic, and he draw cans the line -- he draws the line with rotten compromise. he says everything but rotten compromises. and what are rotten compromises? they're compromises that perpetuate humiliation and degradation for more than one

generation. so it's a line -- and then you have to ask, okay, why draw the line there? so i think the same argument we make in the book applies to international politics, but it's much more complicated international politics, and that is you have to ask whether a compromise will improve on the status quo, will move you towards the principles you believe in and will make it more likely to be able to continue to make progress in the future. and if the answer to those are all yes, then there's really openings for compromise. but if it's going to empower, give more power to a repressive regime rather than rein in their power, then it's dangerous. but the main arguments of our book applies to international politics which is there are no general principles that you can just trot out, um, because the sitting could down and crafting compromises doesn't allow you to know ahead of time what you can

agree to. >> you challenged the wisdom, quote-unquote, of justice shut upper the in the book in terms of governing elites. >> yep. >> and related to that one of the questions is, you say that modern campaigning is not likely to go with away because of money and permanent campaigns. so a democracy or our form of representative democracy, is it still relevant? should we switch to a technocratic is system or oligarchy? what makes democracy the right form today? >> oh, wow. >> that's a deep question, and dennis is going to answer it. [laughter] >> i'm going to ask the person who asked it to stand up and explain herself. >> and stay after class. [laughter] >> it's a serious question, actually, because we take it for granted, as i think most of you do, that campaigns or let's say elections which almost by

definition imply some sort of campaign -- you could have a search committee -- >> you don't want to do that. >> with well, search committee did very well here at penn. [laughter] not always at harvard, but most of the time. [laughter] you're going to have campaigns, and i think we just have to discipline ourselves as citizens. we haven't said anything about civic education which is a little section in the book and something amy's written a hot about. a lot about. the hope of preserving this democracy lies in maybe not us, maybe some of you are young enough to still be in school, but in the next generation. and to some extent that's the people, our message is directed to those people. if we're going to preserve representative democracy which does require a certain amount of self-discipline to get out and

campaign and be uncompromising and join movements and then hold back a little bit, let your representatives govern for a while and then tell them, no, we didn't like what you did not because you didn't keep your pledge, but just because you screwed up. and get rid of them then. so i have hope if we can get that message across that we -- and the alternatives technocratic? no. elitist? no. the experts and elites have not served us very well in the past in the history and even in -- >> right. but it does, so we're just a few blocks from independence hall where the constitution was crafted. and the story goes that when franklin left, a woman confronted him and said what do we have, mr. franklin, and he answered: a republic if we can

keep it. and that question really challenges, i think, democracy and citizens primarily. can we keep it? and i do think that we're at -- it's going to get worse before it gets better. i think the spirit of compromise has faded, and i think until citizens stand up and show that they really care about our republic and about governing, it's not going to revive. but i think it will revive. but if it doesn't, then democracy is really at risk. the spirit of democracy. i don't think any other form of government -- i think winston churchill was right when he said it's the worst form of government except all the others. [laughter]

it's a great form of government when its spirit is alive as it was at the time of the founding with huge injustices. i mean, our founding instand shaded slavery. president lincoln, the greatest -- i think -- one of the two greatest presidents, washington and lincoln, he made compromises in order to preserve the union. and we have to recognize as citizens our responsibility, um, to take control of the future of democracy. so the question of whether we should have an oligarchy isn't really one that we have to take seriously because it would be, you know, it would be a tragedy. it would be the tragedy of our lives but it's not going to be. we really, um, president clinton who's the chair of the national constitution center in his inaugural address 20 years ago said there's nothing wrong with

america that can't be fixed by what's right with america. and i think that's true. but there's an awful lot wrong right now. >> and when you look at bringing it back to one of the comments you made earlier, the lack of regard for congress, for government -- >> yes. >> -- even less so than for the executive branch, 9% according to some polls, the lowest in polling history. what can we do about civic education, a topic in your book, to create a virtual, a virtuous cycle where people care, respect government, want to be engaged, follow it and, therefore, we end up having a higher number of people voting and voting in a better-informed way? is. >> that's absolutely right. i mean, one of the problems is that government doesn't deserve much -- it deserves more than 9%, perhaps. so there is a little bit of

chicken and egg problem here, and that's why the civic education is so important. maybe we can't get out of this nd today, but if next generation learns -- we suggest three things in the book -- learns how compromises were made in the past, how difficult they were, so there's a little bit of history, learns themselves how to understand the views and perspectives of other people not just say, oh, that's nice, you believe that -- but really engage actually in depth in the classroom. and, third, actually learn how to make compromises, maybe on things like school rules or things that matter to the students and have them actually workshop in compromise. well, there's, there's an education program for you, and if that's -- you read the book, you do the education program and come